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INTRODUCTION  tential market of over 425 million people emerges.
The world  was astonished in  1989 by the initial  That  is a market  nearly  70 percent  larger than the
collapse of socialist institutions and subsequently by  United States  about 31 percent larger than the Euro-
the pace  at which change swept  across the Eastern  pean Community market, and moe than double the
European region.  For a time, even the Soviet Union  size of the rapid growth  markets along  the Pacific
seemed to be moving toward greater political plural-  Rm.
ism, market orientation and the effective end of the
Cold War. It is now approaching two years since this  Table 1.  Populations  of East European Countres
political convulsion began (in Poland). This is suffi-  and Soviet Union.
cient time to enable the transition programs to take  1989 Gross National
form, and to permit informed speculation about the  1989  Product
potential for their success and, ultimately, how the  Population  Total  Per Capita
Eastern European and Soviet situations could affect  (millions)  (billions)  (thousands)
the farming and food sectors of our economy.  Bulgaria  9.0  51.2  5.7
The purpose of this paper is to review recent eco-  Czechoslovakia  15.6  123.2  7.9
nomic developments in Europe and the Soviet Union  German  Dem.  16.3  159.5  9.6
and examine  some  of  their  implications  for  U.S.
agriculture and agribusiness. The body of the paper  Hungary  10.6  64.6  6.1
is  organized  into  four  sections.  The  first  section  Poland  37.8  172.4  4.6
presents  the region in  perspective,  to  indicate  the  Yugoslavia  23.0  79.8  3.4
magnitude  of both potential  markets and problems  Romania  23.7  129.5  5.5
being  confronted.  The  second  section  briefly  as-  136.0  780.2  5.7
sesses progress in Eastern Europe and comments on
what appears  to  be the  end of  Perestroika  in the  USSR  288.8  2.66 trillion  9.2
Soviet  Union.  The third  section suggests  how the  Source:  Central Intelligence Agency,  The WorldFact
region's recent developments could affect U.S. farm-  Book  1990.
ers and agribusiness,  both in the short term and in
the years ahead. The fourth and final section contains  Although  the region is a potential  market in that
some summary observations.  purchasing power is still sharply constrained by low
. PROBLES  AND  POTENTIALS  productivity, there  is a strong pent-up  demand  for I. PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS goods and services to help improve living standards.
Until the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf,  Some notion of the market's potential can be seen
there was intense  and building  interest throughout  from a comparison of the high consumption levels
the business  community  (and  especially  agribusi-  of adjacent Western Europe. While incomes in East-
ness) in Europe and the Soviet Union. The reasons  ern Europe are well  above those of the developing
are clear; the region has enormous potential business  world, they nevertheless are but a fraction of those
opportunity.  in the industrialized countries of Western Europe and
The first aspect of this potential is simply size. The  the United  States  (less  than $6,000 per  capita per
six countries plus the former East Germany have a  annum in Eastern Europe versus  about  $20,000 in
population of  136 million  people.  Add  to that  the  Western Europe and the United States).  Any growth
almost 290 million people of the USSR, and a po-  in incomes can be expected to be accompanied  by
1GNP estimates for Eastern Europe and the USSR may be greatly overstated. The USSR presents a clear example. The spread
between the official and unofficial values of the currency  is a factor of over 25:  1 ruble equals $1.82 (official) or 7 cents (black
market). Thus, the average per capita GNP of $9,200 at the official rate would be only a few hundred dollars at the black market rate.
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89increasing  consumption in attempts  to quickly  im-  the  development  of an environment  conducive  to
prove living standards.  free enterprise.  There must be creation of the infra-
Besides interest  in the region as  a market, many  structure required to support and facilitate  a market
firms are considering strategic business positions in  economy. For example, privatization cannot be car-
Eastern  Europe  as  a  "backdoor"  means  to  avoid  ried out without a legal framework allowing private
being locked out of the EC by the 1992 unification.  property to be held and freely transferred,  without a
It is almost certain that most of these countries (and  capital market of some kind, without free prices to
perhaps eventually even the USSR) will be granted  enable valuation of the assets to be privatized, etc.
preferential access to the enlarged EC market (if not  The  magnitude  of  the  adjustments  required
full EC membership),  and companies  located there  throughout the economies and the dislocations  that
will be well-situated  to participate in all European  affect  specific  groups  are  simply  enormous.  The
markets including the EC. Also, location in an East-  governments must be sensitive to the burdens of the
ern European country may prove to be beneficial for  various  groups as  they  simultaneously  design and
taking  advantage  of opportunities  emerging  in the  implement  new  systems  that  support  growth  and
USSR.  economic  expansion-a  very  formidable  task
Agribusiness  companies  also  are  interested  in  indeed.
other  business  possibilities  in  the  region.  Direct
product sales are important, but both joint ventures  II. PROGRESS TO DATE
and  direct  investments  are  being  considered  as  a
The  euphoria  that  accompanied  the  decline  of
means  to  establish manufacturing  and  sales facili-  r  Communism  and  the coming  of greater  personal ties,  to source products,  to assemble  and package,  o  o 
... 1  . . . ^  ~  '  freedom  and  democracy  soon  gave  way  to  more
and to conduct trading and other operations.  Com-  s 
somber  moods  when  the  sheer  enormity  of  the
panies see the opening of these countries as present-  n  e  t 
*^  i~  ?  11.  Jl.  ~~~~needed  economic  transformation  became  clearer.
ing  cheap  assets,  cheap  labor,  and  cheap  raw
ing  cheap  assets,  cinheap  labor,  and  cheap  raw  And it became obvious fairly quickly that not all the
materials,  which, combined  with western  technol-  countries  were as  prepared  as others  to endure the
and . business  man  n  e  s  countries  were as  prepared  as others  to endure the ogy and business management  expertise could pro- ogy  and business  management  expertise could pro-  economic misery of a lengthy transition period. And
duce efficient, competitive business operations. e  eficie,  c  titive bin  o  io  there is wide diversity in approaches being used as
While the business potential  in Eastern European ile the business potential  in Eastern European  well  as in the extent to which market economics  is
countries is considerable, very formidable obstacles  . .. ,  '  .r  •  being embraced. Moreover, the political revolutions
must still be overcome in the transformation to cre-  en  emrace  ore  e  olitical reolutions
are not fully complete min  some countries (Bulgaria,
ate  environments  m  which  that  potential  can  be  oi  iso  e  i
Romania,  Yugoslavia)  so  that  the economic  shifts
realized.  All of the economies  were stagnant or in
have barely begun. decline  when  the  process  started,  suffering  fromy 
decades of gross mismanagement which were com-  The pace of economic reform has been most rapid
pounding  the inherent  weaknesses  of central  plan-  in Poland, followed by Hungary and Czechoslovakia
ning  itself,  so  that  the  problems  were  virtually  with the other countries lagging much further  be-
overwhelming.  And  there  are  no  economic  road  hind.  [This excludes the special case of the former
maps. There is no precedent whatsoever for the shift  German Democratic Republic which was absorbed
from central planning to a market economy. The very  into the FRG and thus had available immediately the
process itself must be invented  even as it is being  supporting  systems (legal  system, convertible  cur-
carried out.  rency, accounting standards, etc.) rather than having
The  economic  problems  plaguing  most  of the  to develop those.]
countries,  and  which  must  be  successfully  over-  While there has been considerable concern about
come, include:  high inflation; non-convertible  cur-  conditions in Eastern Europe, the situation  there is
rencies; multiple exchange rates; state ownership of  not nearly as bleak as the impression often left by the
physical  assets;  huge,  inefficient  bureaucracies;  western press. Much of the press reports reflect what
wage and price controls; no labor or capital markets;  people are saying. However,  it has been noted that
large fiscal deficits;  large external  debts; huge sub-  public complaining has grown enormously with the
sidies throughout; no notion of consumer demand or  advent of a free press, something not possible under
customer  service;  little  comprehensive  under-  the previous repressive government.  The most am-
standing of private enterprise or market economies,  bitious of the  reform programs  is the "shock ther-
and  woefully  few  private  enterprise  skills  (legal,  apy"  approach  undertaken  by  Poland,  with  its
accounting,  marketing, managerial).  ultimate objective of a full market economy. Accord-
Successful  economic  transformation  requires  ingly,  it is being very closely watched by the other
more than abstract policy  changes;  it also  requires  countries and by the Soviets as well.
90On January  1, 1990, Poland adopted a far-ranging  result of "collective dismissals" from entire or par-
strategy  including:  freeing  retail prices,  abolishing  tial plant closings. Some estimates suggest that only
subsidies,  terminating  state  monopolies, devaluing  about one-half of the registered number has actually
the greatly  overvalued  currency  and unifying  the  been laid  off.  Many  workers  are  leaving  the state
exchange  rate,  ending  foreign exchange  rationing,  sector voluntarily to find betterjobs in the fast-grow-
and cutting tariffs.  The results have been largely as  ing private  sector.  There  is,  in fact,  a shortage of
predicted.  Output has fallen, real wages are down,  labor in some big cities at this time.
unemployment  continues to rise,  inflation remains  Reports from Poland indicating severe production
high (at 5 percent per month, but greatly slowed from  declines  (said  to have  fallen almost  one-third  last
the hyperinflation of late  1989 and early 1990),  all  year)  also  are  probably  significantly  exaggerated.
inflicting considerable economic pain on the Polish  First, the benchmark estimates had likely been con-
people.  Once freed,  prices generally  rose  quickly.  siderably  inflated  by  Communist  managers  who
The higher prices  greatly  dampened  demand,  and  padded their output figures to get bonuses or promo-
goods soon began  appearing  on store  shelves. The  tions.  (Now, there are incentives to under-report  to
initial upward spurt in prices accelerated  inflation,  avoid taxes.) Second, the measure of national indus-
but the accompanying  collapse  in  demand  helped  trial output is seriously flawed since it captures only
temper that and induced  the subsequent recession.  the activity  in the state-owned  industrial  sector.  It
As production declined, many of  the state enterprises  does not include non-industrial  or private firms. A
folded,  finding they could not operate without their  substantial  amount  of production  has shifted from
former  subsidies  (especially  when  producing  state to private firms, and from industry to the serv-
shoddy  goods  that  no one really  wanted).  Unem-  ices sector. Some estimates suggest that perhaps only
ployment rose rapidly, but has fallen to only about 7  one-third of the reported decline is real.
percent of the workforce,  close to the current U.S.  Poland has paid especial attention to its trade sec-
rate.  tor. It made the zloty convertible on the trade account
However,  there is a brighter side  to the bad eco-  from the outset, and, since the infrastructure did not
nomic news about  Eastern Europe. Things  are  not  exist for instant domestic competition to develop, it
nearly as dismal as often reported. Again, the case of  has viewed free trade as the most effective means of
Poland is instructive,  importing competition. Free trade allows the impor-
Since the anti-export bias was removed from Pol-  tation  of a rational  price  structure,  and stimulates
ish  economic  policies  at  the beginning  of  1990,  contacts  with western firms which bring their new
exports  to  the west  have  grown  rapidly  to  $11.4  technology  and improved products.
billion,  up  from  $8.5  billion  in  1989,  with  some  Finally, reports of huge declines in living standards
increase coming from all sectors of the economy. At  also  appear  exaggerated.  When  prices  were  freed
the  same time,  imports  fell  as  enterprises  econo-  and the subsidies were removed, purchasing power
mized on raw  material use  in  response  to budget  was reduced.  But the oft-mentioned  30 percent  de-
constraints and a higher valued currency.  The zloty,  dine is a comparison  of 1990 with 1989,  a year of
which was  devalued  by two-thirds,  was pegged at  hyperinflation when wages were growing rapidly. If
PLZ  9,500/U.S.  $1  and  maintained  at  that  rate  the  comparison  is  with  1987,  the decline  in  real
throughout the year. With the establishment  of sta-  wages  is seen  to  be much smaller.  And  there  are
bilization funds,  it also became  convertible  on the  intangible changes that are not reflected in the meas-
trade account.  urement. For example, Polish housewives no longer
The  rising  unemployment  numbers  also  merit  have to spend two to three hours each day in queues
some explanation. In the first place, they began from  only to be presented with few choices among inferior
a very low level (the theoretical zero unemployment  products. The increased dollar purchasing power of
of a socialist system), rising to the current estimate  the now stable zloty also has a little-noticed positive
of about  1.25  million  workers.  However,  the  esti-  effect on the standard of living. At the black market
mates may overstate the actual change.  Many of the  rate for the  dollar, the average  monthly wage was
workers registering had been unemployed already in  $40 in late  1987. In late  1990, it was $131,  making
the previous system. Registrations were also spurred  available  many  foreign  goods that  were  formerly
by  expectations  that benefits  would  be  available,  unattainable.
prompting  the enrollment of many housewives  en-  To  be sure,  there  are  many  difficulties  with the
tering the labor force for the first time and of traders  Polish reform program. Even though much has been
seeking to augment their unreported income.  Over-  accomplished in little more than a year, the pace still
all, layoffs have actually been fewer than expected.  proved  unsatisfactory  to many  voters who elected
Only a small proportion of the unemployment is a  Lech  Walesa  on promises  of even faster  reforms.
91Privatization,  especially,  has been  slow,  and  the  5  expanding  markets  for  U.S.  farm  products,  food
percent  monthly  inflation continues  to be a major  products,  farming  technologies  and production  in-
problem.  Shifting the productive  assets into private  puts,  and  food  processing  technology  and  equip-
hands  is the immediate  challenge.  The new Prime  ment? Or will they become direct competitors, not
Minister and his  government  favor  an accelerated  only in their own and third country markets, but will
program, and new steps are expected before spring.  they also seek much greater direct access to the U.S.
But the task is formidable. Some five to seven thou-  market?
sand enterprises must be privatized, likely by some  Examination of these questions involves two time
unique large-scale means since the absence of credit  periods:  the transition  during the next two to four
institutions and share markets precludes typical ap-  years as  the agriculture  and food sectors  adjust to
proaches.  free  market  systems;  and the longer run  after  the
Another continuing  major problem  for Poland is  transitional adjustments are complete.
the huge external debt, now at almost $45 billion. Its
mere existence  stifles critically-needed  foreign in-  The Short Term Outlook
vestment.  Increasing  calls are being  made for for-  The first possibility  concerns expanding  sales  of
giveness  of much of that debt, especially  the part  U.S. agricultural products. It is noteworthy that these
(about  two-thirds)  owed  to  foreign  governments.  countries have  not been major  agricultural  trading
Proponents  argue  that  this  was  money  loaned  to  partners for the United States over the past decade.
Communist governments for political reasons (to try  In calendar year 1989, U.S. agricultural export sales
to draw Poland closer to a consumer society),  and  in Eastern Europe  amounted to  only $320 million
that  it  should not  now be  an  impediment  to  the  (less than 1 percent of the U.S. total). At the same
successful transformation to democracy and market  time, U.S. imports were even less ($245 million), for
economies.  a net trade surplus of $75  million. Our exports are
Problems of other countries in the region are simi-  primarily  grains  (feed  grains and  wheat)  and soy-
lar to those of Poland.  Their relatively  slower pace  bean  meal, while  the imports  are meats,  cheeses,
in instituting  reforms  relates  to  practical  politics,  tobacco, and other specialty products.
cultural differences,  and their individual situations.  The trade picture with the Soviet Union contrasts
The Polish people thus far have been unwavering in  sharply with that of the rest of the region. In calendar
their willingness to bear economic hardship during  year  1989,  we  sold  $3.4  billion to  the Soviets  (9
the transition.  Citizens of the other countries are not  percent of total sales), while importing less than $20
thought  to be as willing  as the Poles to give  their  million.
leadership the political mandate to move so quickly.  There was some initial euphoria  that these coun-
Thus, the reform process in Hungary and Czechoslo-  tries would be rapidly expanding  markets for U.S.
vakia is not proceeding  as rapidly as in Poland, and  grain, oilseed, and livestock products. Although that
it is  certainly  much slower in  Romania,  Bulgaria,  expectation  vanished  quickly,  there  may  well  be
and  Yugoslavia (where the ethnic divisions  among  some expansion of their imports over the next few
other things undermine obtaining  political stability  years as their purchasing power increases over levels
required to effect reforms).  of the past decade.  Additional  income sources will
be economic assistance from the West, external debt
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. III. IMPLICATIONS  FOR U.S.  relief,  and  perhaps  some  improvement  in their
AGRICULTURE AND AGRIBUSINESS economies as the transformation programs begin to
The Central and Eastern European countries tradi-  take hold (growing convertible currency sales to the
tionally have been relatively  large agricultural  pro-  West accompanying  their already greater  access to
ducers  and  traders.  But  their  farming  and  food  these  markets,  for  example.  The  EC  already  has
systems suffered heavily during the Communist era,  concluded  Preferential  Trade Agreements with Po-
largely  isolated  from  new technologies  and made  land, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia,  and the U.S. has
increasingly inefficient by central planning.  Also, it  now granted Most Favored Nation status to three of
is important to note that while the region maintains  the countries and is in the process of doing so for the
a large livestock  sector,  it is a deficit  protein  pro-  others.
ducer.  Proponents of reform argue that debt relief is es-
The central question, of  course, is what the produc-  sential.  Collectively,  their  outstanding  debt  ap-
tion patterns of the future will be, once market prices  proaches  $100  billion, with  the most  (two-thirds)
rather  than centrally  set quotas  and  goals allocate  owed  by Poland  and  Hungary ($1,200 per capita).
resources  and guide  farmers'  production and  con-  Several  billion dollars  are  required  each  year  for
sumers' purchase decisions.  Will these countries be  Poland  to  service  its  almost  $45  billion  debt,  an
92important share of total foreign exchange earnings.  Without exception, these countries (especially the
Roughly  two  thirds  of the  debt is  owed  to  other  USSR) are starved for consumer goods and the tech-
governments,  and  one third to  commercial  banks.  nologies used to  produce them  in  the West.  They
Substantial  forgiveness  by  the former,  and liberal  likely will purchase farm production inputs to boost
restructuring by the latter, could free several billion  output quickly so as to reduce (or at least stabilize)
annually for critical import needs.  Hungary,  with a  food prices and improve quality and variety. These
$20  billion debt,  would  benefit in much the same  inputs include fertilizers, pesticides, specialized ma-
way.  chinery, and livestock feed (especially proteins, but
The magnitude of economic assistance flowing to  also feed grains). With a tradition of animal agricul-
the region is substantial. The group of 24 industrial-  ture, these countries are interested especially in live-
ized nations (G-24) has pledged and contributed $38  stock  production  technology-new  breeding  and
billion in grants and loans to Eastern Europe over the  husbandry techniques, including artificial insemina-
last  18 months.  Originally  targeted to  Poland and  tion and embryo transplants.  They can also be ex-
Hungary, the program now extends to Czechoslova-  pected to purchase some food grains  (bread quality
kia, Bulgaria,  Yugoslavia,  and East Germany. (Ear-  wheat for blending),  perhaps some meat products,
lier plans to include Romania were  scrapped when  and other incidental food products.
demonstrations were violently suppressed in Bucha-  These  countries  likely  will  consider the mainte-
rest last June.  However, the political situation there  nance  and  improvement of their  livestock sectors
is viewed  as improving, and  aid  could be  granted  very important. Greater efficiency and expansion are
soon.)  associated  with  improved animal  nutrition,  which
Of  these  funds,  about  two-thirds  have  gone  to  depends upon protein feed supplements. The region
Poland and Hungary, and 5 percent to Czechoslova-  is deficient  in protein production, largely  owing to
kia (with nearly one-quarter still unallocated).  The  climate.  Thus,  it is reasonable  to expect  increased
$38 billion includes $11 billion capitalization for the  protein imports, at least in the short run.
newly-established  European  Bank for Reconstruc-  Beyond  this,  another  high-priority  area  is  food
tion and Development  which will loan throughout  processing machinery and equipment and improved
the region and the USSR,  $8 billion in grants,  and  packaging materials. The centrally planned systems
$12  billion  in loans and credits  including  over  $1  are notorious for post-harvest losses, commonly  30
billion in European Investment Bank credit guaran-  percent or more. Most processing technology  is an-
tees. The World Bank and the IMF have made avail-  tiquated, consisting of machinery long discarded by
able $6 billion.  the  West. Even the newer facilities have had little
About  35  percent of all the aid  has been export  maintenance  or  upgrading  for  a  decade  or more.
credits  and  investment  support,  while  macroeco-  Improved  processing  capacity  and  more  modem
nomic aid (such as stabilization loans) accounts for  packaging  will not only reduce losses and increase
29 percent. About 4 percent has gone to food aid and  the quantity  of food  available, but should also  im-
2.4  percent  to  the  environment.  (The  12  member  prove quality and presentation to consumers.
states of the EC individually  have provided 48 per-  To summarize, the Eastern European countries can
cent of  all aid, the EC budget accounts for 18 percent,  expect increased  purchasing power in the next few
Japan  11 percent, and the United States 9 percent).  years,  and  likely  will  increase  their  purchases  of
Overall,  it is very  apparent  that these countries'  farm inputs,  feedstuffs  (including  feed  grains  and
purchasing power already has grown and likely will  soybean meal), food processing machinery and tech-
grow substantially more in the next few years. This  nology.
then raises the question of what they are likely to buy.
Food (and agriculture)  can be expected to figure  The Long-Term Outlook
prominently,  because of their special  political  sig-  But what  about  the  longer term?  What kind  of
nificance  in all these economies.  Food availability  trading partners will these countries be in five or ten
and prices are barometers of economic progress and  years?  Since  the  changes  have  only  begun,  it  is
the success of the economic reform programs.  The  simply much too early to tell. Much depends on how
economic reforms that freed food prices (and ended  productive they become, and what they  can afford.
subsidies) also raised consumer prices and increased  After  decades  of mismanagement,  administered
the income share required for food (already one half  prices, and  artificially  determined  resource  alloca-
or more of the disposable income  in most of these  tion, today's production  and consumption  patterns
countries.)  For reasons  closely  related  to political  may bear little relation to those which market forces
stability,  food product  purchases  will receive high  will dictate. Substantial production adjustments will
priority.  occur in the next few years, and likely will be accom-
93panied  by expansions  in output because  of greater  plications obviously  are  far different  for  different
access  to  improved inputs.  (Much  of the planned  subsectors  of U.S. agriculture  and agribusiness.
OECD assistance will be production-sector oriented,  Beyond  product  sales,  U.S.  agribusinesses  have
i.e.,  promoting  greater  output.)  These  short-run  critical interests in unfolding potential opportunities
shifts are unlikely  to alter trade patterns fundamen-  across the European continent. While opportunities
tally.  vary depending upon strategic interests, many U.S.
The longer run may prove to be a much different  agribusinesses  are contemplating  investment in the
matter.  How  will  Eastern  Europe  and  the  USSR  region.  The motivations are  varied.  Some wish to
develop as trading partners? Will they be self suffi-  establish operating entities that can take full advan-
cient  in  grains  and meats?  Will  they  be  growing  tage  of  relatively  inexpensive  assets  to  combine
protein importers? Will they prove larger or smaller  them with their modem technology and management
markets for U.S. farm products?  Again, it is simply  to create highly efficient and competitive businesses
too  early to  tell.  The outcome  depends  on  capital  for  the  entire European  market.  Others  are  more
availability and investment patterns, as well as pol-  interested  in sourcing raw material  for key market
icy decisions. The mismanagement, distortions, and  opportunities,  while  still  others  simply  position
resource misallocations have been enormous, devel-  themselves for access to the enlarged European mar-
oped by powerful  forces over long periods of time.  ket-Eastern Europe and the USSR, but certainly the
And they will be expensive and time consuming to  Western  European  market  as well-a response  in
overcome.  part to "Europe  1992."
Now that internal prices will reflect world market  Eastern Europe and the USSR are the new business
prices (to varying  extents,  but certainly  more than  frontiers of today. The first investors and operating
previously) and will allocate resources, the emerging  firms to become established  likely will be the most
production  and investment patterns  may  prove far  advantageously situated. But while the region holds
different from those under central planning.  These  vast potential,  it also involves  enormous risks sug-
patterns will also be influenced by non-agricultural  gesting  it be approached  with realistic caution and
factors, such as labor costs which will be relatively  careful assessment of the opportunities.
low, at least for such a while. This might suggest that
competitive  positions could be improved by focus-  Summary
ing on relatively labor-intensive production, such as  Much of the euphoria that accompanied  the initial
fruits and vegetables, livestock and meat, and value-  emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe and the
added products  (if enough hard currency capital  is  USSR  has  faded,  now  that  the enormous  task of
available to upgrade production facilities to produce  restructuring  these  economies  is  underway.  And,
export quality products).  Exports will be of special  while  the  potential  longer-term  impacts  of  these
interest, because of the proximity of Western Euro-  shifts on U.S. agriculture remain far from clear, they
pean markets, and perhaps others, as  well. For ex-  likely mean greater short-term market opportunities
ample, meat exports to the USSR for hard currency  as  economic  reform,  development  assistance  and
could be attractive  since trade among the COME-  revitalized economic growth permit Eastern Europe
CON  countries is shifting  quickly to a convertible  to buy more from the West.
currency basis.  The picture is much less clear in the USSR where
What  about  the USSR  over the  long term?  The  imports of U.S. products were already large. Even in
political  situation now  is  so  fluid  that  economic  the short term, their needs for western agricultural
conjecture is not very meaningful. The political situ-  products will be very large.  The primary concern is
ation  will determine  long-run  economic  develop-  whether growing political uncertainty  and currency
ment progress. The USSR is now a big U.S. market  problems will encourage the credit and support the
($3.4 billion U.S. imports). Substantial development  level of imports  necessary  to meet domestic  needs
over the next decade  (requiring  a tranquil political  and increase productivity.
evolution)  means greater opportunity to develop its  The region's longer-term potential continues to be
agricultural infrastructure and to invest in agribusi-  enormous. The six Eastern European countries plus
nesses of all kinds.  This could  reduce total import  the USSR create a potential market much larger than
needs,  especially  for  feed  grains,  but  could  still  do the United States, the EC, and the Pacific  Rim.
involve substantial trade in both finished goods and  Incomes and consumption levels are low, compared
inputs (for example, protein feed  concentrates).  In  with levels in Western Europe and the United States.
any event, improvement in the Soviet food situation  Consumption can be expected to grow rapidly, com-
will require substantial external assistance, whether  mensurate with income growth. These countries are
in raw materials or processing technology.  The im-  wealthy in resources and have a well-educated labor
94force. Their growth potential now is limited primar-  yet, since they have only begun.  Future production
ily by the pace of the reforms and the availability of  and  consumption  patterns  may bear  little  resem-
longer-term investment capital.  blance to those of today, which reflect the misman-
In general,  economic reform is progressing more  agement,  administered  prices  and  artificially
rapidly than has been reported by the western press.  determined  resource  allocation  of the  last  four
Poland is an example; recent elections strengthened  decades.
their commitment to economic reform.  And, while  These  shifts  depend  on  both  political  and  eco-
the economic shocks of free market prices have been  nomic relationships,  especially the critical question
severe,  they  are far smaller  than  indicated by the  of market access for these countries. And the pattern
press.  will depend on capital  availability  and investment
Unemployment  in near western levels in Poland,  patterns over the longer run. The mismanagement,
exports are growing, the currency has stabilized, and  distortions,  and resource  misallocations  have been
investment  is increasing.  Declines in living  stand-  enormous, developed by powerful forces over long
ards,  while serious,  have been  much smaller  than  periods  of time. They will be both  expensive  and
initially indicated.  Perhaps  the greatest problem is  time  consuming  to  overcome,  now  that  internal
the huge  external debt, much of which  is held by  prices will reflect world  market prices rather  than
western governments,  and which could be restruc-  arbitrary administrative decisions.
tured/reduced to increase capital available for trade  Initially,  cheap labor could lead to concentration
and investment.  on  labor  intensive,  high  value  added  production
Problems of other countries in the region are simi-  (fruits and vegetables,  livestock and meats), assum-
lar to  those of Poland,  although the approach  and  ing capital to bring facilities to export quality can be
pace of reform varies widely. In general, the reform  found.  And much of the eventual outcome will de-
process in Hungary  and Czechoslovakia is not pro-  pend on the resolution of the fluid political situation
ceeding as  rapidly as in Poland,  and it certainly  is  in the USSR. There, substantial short- and long-term
much slower in Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia  economic assistance will be required. Whether or not
(where ethnic divisions, among other things, under-  the internal situation in the USSR permits that, in-
mines political  stability required to effect reforms).  vestment will have a major role in determining the
The implications of these changes for U.S. agricul-  future shape of U.S. markets in the region.
ture over the longer term simply cannot be seen as
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